International Corporate Taxation and U.S. Multinationals’ Behavior: an Integrated Approach by Azémar, Céline
scottish institute for research in economics
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER
SIRE-DP-2008-40
International Corporate Taxation and U.S.




International Corporate Taxation and U.S.




Using data from the International Revenue Service, this paper explores the effects of
corporate taxation on U.S. capital invested abroad and on tax planning practices (divi-
dend payments, income shifting, and passive investment). The econometric analysis first
indicates that investment is strongly influenced by average tax rates, with a magnified im-
pact for particularly low-tax rates implying that the attractiveness of low-tax countries is
not weakened by anti-deferral rules and cross-crediting limitations. Further explorations
suggest that firms report higher profit and are less likely to repatriate dividends when
they are located in low-tax jurisdictions. Firms also report higher Subpart F income in
countries in which they shift their profit, suggesting that cross-crediting provides an in-
centive to shift passive income in low-tax countries and that passive investment can be an
alternative strategy to minimize taxes when active investment opportunities are lacking.
Finally, the paper estimates the role of effective transfer pricing regulation on income
shifting activities using the quality of host countries’ law enforcement. It appears that
low degrees of law enforcement are associated with higher income-shifting.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, advances in the literature on international taxation has increased
our understanding about the behavioral impact of foreign corporate tax rates on multinational
activities. It is now widely accepted that tax differentials among countries and the interaction
between the home and the host countries’ tax systems not only influence the location and
the amount of capital invested abroad, but also the financing of investment, the repatriation of
dividends, and the transactions between related parties located in different jurisdictions (Hines,
1999).
Because each of these decisions has been investigated separately, the aim of this paper is
to establish bridges among the disparate elements of the fructuous tax literature to provide
a more complete picture of the impact of taxes on the behavior of multinational firms. The
use of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service database makes such endeavor possible, allowing to
consider the influence of taxation on four decisions: (i) real investment, (ii) income shifting,
(iii) dividend repatriation, and (iv) Subpart F income. The approach is then twofold. First, the
paper replicates existing studies on U.S. multinationals by using more recent data, additional
covariates and panel data techniques. Second, the paper builds upon these previous studies in
order to shed light on three issues that remain unconsidered.
First, it is well understood that deferral and cross-crediting alter the global capital export
neutrality of the U.S. tax system and a number of papers find that taxes have a negative
impact on foreign investment. However these studies do not consider whether there is an
asymmetry of investment responses to low and high tax rates. The Joint Committee on Taxation
(2003) emphasizes that anti-deferral rules and cross-crediting limitations imposed by the U.S.
tax system should limit the incentive to invest in low-tax jurisdictions. If, the complications
generated by anti-deferral and cross-crediting limitations have a significant impact on the capital
invested abroad, this should empirically induce an asymmetry, with a lower elasticity between
taxes and capital in low-tax countries. This paper tests whether there is a diverging elasticity
between taxes and capital in low-tax and high-tax jurisdictions.
Once the investment is done, multinational firms have at their disposal various possibilities
to reduce their overall tax liabilities. They can shift income from an affiliate located in a high-
tax country to an affiliate located in low tax country and preserve these tax-saving benefits by
deferring the repatriation of their profits, as long as they can find active use of their earnings.
However, existing work on tax avoidance strategies does not detail the extent to which passive
investment can be an alternative method to minimize taxes, when active investment opportu-
nities are limited. Investors’ passive investment strategies can be considered by investigating
the links between foreign taxes and Subpart F income.
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Finally, another limitation of the literature on tax avoidance is to make the assumption that
countries do not differ in the enforcement of transfer pricing rules, by omitting to consider the
level of development or the legislative maturity of the host country as determinants of income
shifting. The paper investigates whether the ability to shift income is influenced by the level
of development and the quality of law enforcement of the host country which are likely to be
correlated with the maturity of its transfer pricing legislation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses why investment responses to
low and high tax rates may be asymmetric, and addresses the role of passive investment and
law enforcement on tax planning practices. Section 3 presents the data sources and descriptive
statistics. Section 4 measures the impact of taxes on U.S. multinationals’ investment and on
tax planning activities. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 U.S. Multinationals’ Behavior and International Tax-
ation
2.1 The Potential Asymmetry of Investment Responses to Low and
High Tax Rates
Hines (1999) provides an overview of the literature that investigates the sensitivity of FDI to
international taxation, concluding that foreign corporate tax rates influence the location and the
volume of FDI. Two forms of empirical evidence can be distinguished. The first form is based on
time-series aggregate data and investigates the relationship between FDI and after-tax rates of
return in the United States. This type of study, such as Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987)
and Newlon (1987), reports a positive relationship between both phenomena. The second form
corresponds to cross-sectional or panel studies based on various measures of multinationals’
activity. Among this literature, several studies exploit the corporate tax-differential across
countries to identify the effect of taxes on U.S. FDI. Using the U.S. Commerce Department’s
1982 Benchmark Survey data, Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) find that the
level of average tax rate has a negative influence on the cross-sectional distribution abroad of the
net stock of property, plant and equipment (PPE) of U.S. affiliates. Based on more recent data
and measuring capital stock via U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFC) assets, Grubert
and Mutti (2000) and Altshuler et al. (2001) also show that the capital of U.S. multinationals is
significantly influenced by the average tax rate in 1984 and in 1992. This impact appears to be
magnified for low tax rates and for countries with an open regime (Grubert and Mutti, 2000),
and seems to have increased over time (Altshuler et al., 2001). In Mutti and Grubert (2004),
the influence of taxes is also observed when the U.S. activity is measured by gross product
originating (value added) and when fixed effects are incorporated. Their study covers the years
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1982, 1989, and 1994.
A pure worldwide tax system would not distort the decision about whether to locate invest-
ment at home or abroad since companies would be subject to taxation on all income regardless
of where that income is earned. The U.S. system of taxation can be considered as a hybrid, con-
taining elements consistent with both capital-export neutrality and capital-import neutrality.1
On the one hand, cross-crediting and tax deferral allow decisions on the location and volume of
investment to be distorted by taxes. Indeed, in order to prevent double taxation, U.S. multi-
nationals are able to claim a credit for income tax paid abroad up to the tentative U.S. tax.
In practice, the U.S. method of calculating the foreign tax-credit limit, called ‘worldwide aver-
aging’ or ‘cross-crediting’, uses the total worldwide foreign income of the taxpayer. When the
foreign taxes paid exceed the U.S. tax liability on foreign source income, the investor is in an
‘excess credit’ position. By averaging foreign tax liabilities, this method provides an incentive
for ‘excess credit’ investors to locate activities in low-tax countries, since taxes imposed by a
high-tax country (i.e. tax rate higher than the U.S. one) can be used to offset U.S. taxes on
income earned by the same tax payer in the low-tax country (i.e. tax rate lower than the U.S.
one). In addition, the income earned abroad by foreign affiliates is subject to U.S. taxation
only when it is remitted as dividends to the U.S. parent. Simple tax considerations therefore
make it attractive to invest in low-tax countries and to defer the repatriation of profit, since
deferral increases the reinvestment in each period (when the foreign taxes are lower than the
U.S. statutory corporate tax rate), and thus increases the cumulative profit (net of taxation)
at the end of the period.
On the other hand, to limit incentives for outward investment, the U.S. tax system has anti-
deferral regimes for certain types of incomes2 and cross-crediting limitations that allow averaging
within basket only, since the inclusion of separate foreign tax-credit baskets in the 1986 Tax
Reform Act.3 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (2003), limiting the ability
of cross-crediting and deferral “moves the tax treatment of the marginal outbound investment
by a U.S. investor away from capital import neutrality and toward capital export neutrality.”
(p27). The negative correlation between taxes and U.S. capital obtained by the literature does
not indicate however, whether there is an asymmetry between taxes and capital in high-tax
1Capital export neutrality implies a neutrality towards the decision whether to invest at home or abroad.
Capital flows are only influenced by economic fundamentals and employed where they are the most productive
without being distorted by tax considerations. Capital export neutrality can be achieve with a worldwide
tax system where investors pay domestic taxes on their foreign income. Investors can thus locate investment
anywhere in the world and pay the same taxes. Under capital import neutrality, investors are subject to the
same tax rate in the country in which they operate, no matter their nationality. Promoting competitiveness but
allowing capital allocation to be diverted by taxes, capital import neutrality can be achieve with an exempt tax
system, where income earned abroad is exempt from home country taxes.
2Passive income and various sales and services’ activities do not benefit from deferral.
3Since 1986, investors may only cross-credit excess foreign tax paid to one country against U.S. tax on
equivalent types of income earned in a low-tax country. For example, this separate foreign tax-credit basket
rule avoids the cross-crediting between taxes of active and passive income.
4
jurisdictions and in low-tax jurisdictions. If the complications generated by anti-deferral and
cross-crediting limitations have their expected effect, i.e. to remove the attractiveness of low-tax
jurisdictions, an asymmetry should be observed between the sensitivity of U.S. capital relative
to corporate taxes in low-tax and high-tax countries, with a lower elasticity between taxes and
capital in low-tax countries as compared with high-tax countries.
2.2 The Role of Passive Investment
The strategies of multinational firms to minimize their tax liabilities are not limited to the
decisions of the location and the size of their investments. Once the investment is realized and
a profit generated, multinationals have at their disposal alternative methods to minimize their
fiscal burden.
Since cross-crediting allows some income from low-tax countries to remain effectively un-
taxed in the U.S. when repatriated, and because deferral allows tax-saving benefits generated
in or shifted to low-tax countries to be preserved, multinationals have incentives to shift prof-
its from high-tax countries to low-tax countries. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice
(1994), and Louie and Rousslang (2008) give credence to such a practice by investigating the
impact of taxes on profitability measures. Their results suggest a negative relationship between
foreign tax rates and U.S. affiliates’ profitability, indicating that firms declare more income in
low-tax jurisdictions. The advantages provided by cross-crediting and deferral are exclusive in
that the first is generated by repatriation, the second, by definition, by deferral. The relation-
ship between dividend and taxes found by the literature suggests that deferral is the privileged
method: low-tax rates are associated with lower dividend remittance to the U.S. parents. Ev-
idence of this behavior is provided first by Kopits (1972) who shows that dividend payments
of U.S. manufacturing CFC are positively correlated with local tax rates. Grubert and Mutti
(2001) corroborate these results. They show that, in 1992, the ratio of total dividends to the
U.S. divided by total after-tax earnings and profits decreases with lower levels of host country
average tax rates.
These studies leave open questions about the role of passive investment strategies in the tax
avoidance process. The Subpart F provision, which is the main anti-deferral regime of relevance
to a U.S.-based multinational, specifies that income from passive investment and from business
service industries earned abroad is deemed to have been distributed by U.S. firms to their
parents, and therefore is immediately subject to U.S. taxation. This provision is intended to
prevent multinationals from avoiding taxes by shifting highly mobile passive income away from
the U.S. or another high-tax country into a low-tax country. Indeed, what is the point of
shifting passive income, if one can no longer take advantage of deferral? However, tax planning
opportunities also arise if income earned in a low-tax jurisdiction can be offset with excess tax
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credits from another jurisdiction. The ability to cross-credit between taxes on passive incomes
can thus provide an incentive to shift this income in spite of the Subpart F rule as long as the
investor is in an ‘excess credit’ position.4
Passive investment can also represent an alternative profitable way to use earnings when
multinationals cannot find active use of their funds in low-tax countries (thus influencing active-
income shifting and dividend retentions). As emphasized by Hines and Rice (1994), in spite of
the Subpart F provision, investing profits in the world capital market can be more profitable
than repatriation as long as r∗/r > (1 − τ)/(1 − τ ∗), where r∗ is the rate of return of the
passive investment, r is the U.S. domestic interest rate, τ ∗ is the foreign tax rate and τ the U.S.
tax rate. Basic stylized facts calculated from the Internal Revenue Service database suggest a
relationship between the level of taxes, reported income and dividend payments. Thus, between
1992 and 2000, U.S. CFC in countries with an average tax rate below or equal to 10%5 had
$15.2 billions Subpart F income6 out of $69.9 billions earnings and profits, corresponding to
2.3 times the total amount of dividends repatriated from these countries; whereas, in countries
with an average tax rate higher than 35%7, Subpart F income represented less than one-forth
of total dividend payments. The relationship between U.S. Subpart F income and corporate
tax rates can reveal the degree to which multinational firms use passive investment as a tax
minimization strategy.
2.3 Level of Development, Legislative Maturity, and Tax Avoidance
Another caveat with the literature on tax avoidance is to assume that countries do not differ in
the enforcement of transfer pricing rules, by omitting to consider the level of development and
the legislative maturity of the host country as determinants of income-shifting.
4Investors in an excess credit position can use this excess credit to offset any U.S. tax payments on foreign
income made in the previous two years or the following five years (without interest). Inflation and a persistent
excess credit position make passive income shifting profitable as long as the investor is in excess credit position,
i.e. as long as the ratio of total foreign income tax paid on total foreign profit is higher than the U.S. statutory
tax rate.
5Ireland, Poland, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Panama, Switzerland and Dominican Republic.
6Subpart F income mainly consists on income from passive investment but also includes other income that
is readily movable from one jurisdiction to another. As defined by the Joint Committee on Taxation (2003),
“Subpart F income consists of foreign base company income, insurance income, and certain income relating to
international boycotts and other violations of public policy. Foreign base company income consists of foreign
personal holding company income, which includes passive income (e.g., dividends, interest, rents, and royalties),
as well as a number of categories of non-passive income, including foreign base company sales income, foreign
base company services income, foreign base company shipping income and foreign base company oil-related
income.” (p12).
7Japan, Honduras, Morocco and Greece.
6
Developing countries8 are more vulnerable to transfer pricing9 abuses because the weaknesses
of their legal system amplify the difficulty of establishing rules-based transfer pricing, audits
and penalties (Brean, 1979; Plasschaert, 1985). One of the aims of the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines is to provide technical information on the implementation and administration of
transfer pricing rules to help tax authorities of poor and emerging countries receive a fair share
of the tax base of multinational companies. However, these countries are still limited by a lack
of resources (required to run their tax authorities and to challenge in courts the multinationals
accused of transfer pricing manipulation), their lack of experience in detecting transfer prices
not established at arm’s length standard, and the difficulty of collecting data (when comparable
product does not exist locally).
Another complication comes from the fact that the U.S. tax treaty network is not well de-
veloped with developing countries and the exchange of information between the tax authorities
of the home and the host countries is imperative to avoid income shifting.10 The establishment
of adequate expertise for transfer pricing in developing countries is thus not facilitated in the
case of U.S. firms.
Finally, a further barrier that may prevent developing countries from regulating transfer
pricing is a political one (Lall, 1979). The attraction of foreign investment is an important policy
objective and the regulation of transfer pricing that increases effective tax rates may discourage
capital inflows. Chan and Chow (1997) and UNCTAD (1999) stress that tax authorities may
avoid auditing large and high technology affiliates, as they are afraid of losing them to another
country.
All in all, the complexity of curbing tax evasion in less developed countries with, when they
8According to the World Bank, a developing country is a country in which the majority of population
makes far less income, often lacks basic public services, and has significantly weaker social indicators, than the
population in high-income countries. The World Bank classifies countries into the categories of (1) Low income,
(2) Lower middle income, (3) Upper middle income and (4) High income. The commonly used term “Developing
Countries” corresponds to the “Low income” plus the “Middle income” categories. Following the World Bank
classification, developing countries considered in this paper correspond to countries of the sample with a GDP
per capita that is lower than 10, 000 USD in 1992.
9Transfer pricing is a common operation of multinational firms. It refers to the international transfer of goods,
services and intangibles between related parties. The price charged for these transfers is known as a “transfer
price” and is required to be paid at arm’s length prices, i.e. at market prices. However arm’s length prices are
not always observable as in many situations goods are unique. It can be advantageous for multinational firms
to reduce or avoid taxes by manipulating transfer prices. Affiliates located in low-tax countries can overprice
their sales to other foreign affiliates in order to shift income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.
10The primary purpose of bilateral tax treaties is the avoidance of double taxation and the avoidance of evasion
of taxes on income and capital. However, of the total income treaties in effect with the U.S. (49 at October
31, 1999), only about a quarter are with developing countries. As emphasized by Toaze (2001), the difficulties
encountered by the U.S. in extending its tax-treaty network with developing countries can be explained by the
fact that they do not want to grant major tax incentives such as tax sparing provisions (see Hines (2001) and
Aze´mar et al. (2007) for a discussion of tax sparing agreements and their impact on FDI activity). Among the
sample, and during the sample period, 20 countries have not signed a bilateral tax treaty with the U.S. and
they are almost all developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and
Zimbabwe.
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exist, less sophisticated transfer pricing regulations, can be a factor of multinational income-
shifting, and by extension of dividend retentions. Because multinationals are less likely to
experience a transfer pricing examination in the developing world and to a greater extent, of
having an adjustment or penalty on audit in these countries than in well-enforced transfer
pricing legislations, cross-country differences in transfer pricing regulations need to be taken
into account when measuring tax planning practices.
3 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
The data employed in this paper are the 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 U.S. Treasury CFC
files compiled by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The database includes, for each of the
five periods, financial information about the 7,500 largest foreign corporations controlled by
U.S. multinationals with total assets in excess of 500 million USD. According to the IRS, a for-
eign corporation is “controlled” if U.S. shareholders own more than 50% of the value of all its
outstanding stock on any day during the foreign corporation’s tax year. The database reports
aggregate information (by foreign country) on U.S. subsidiary assets, earnings and profits, in-
come taxes, Subpart F income, dividends repatriated, and other information on the distribution
out of earnings and profits and on the receipts and payments made by the foreign corporations.
The data are reported by corporations according to general U.S. accounting principles. They
are historical book values, implying that they may be affected by local exchange rates and
inflation.
The total assets of CFC is the measure of capital, and is the only measure of capital available
in the dataset. Finding a good approximation of capital, i.e. a measure that reflects the
productive activity of the firm, is a difficult task in empirical research. Capital is generally
measured by fixed assets (PPE) or total assets. PPE, used in Grubert and Mutti (1991) and
Hines and Rice (1994), is probably the measure that provides the best approximation for the
distribution of production since fixed assets, as opposed to intangible and financial assets, can
hardly be manipulated for tax purposes and should thus reflect the level of physical presence
of affiliates (Hines and Rice, 1994; Lipsey, 2007). However, as emphasized by Lipsey (2007), in
a world in which much of the production is the output from intangible assets, one limitation
of PPE measure is to exclude these intangible assets. As in Grubert and Mutti (2000) and
Altshuler et al. (2001), using total assets provides a broader picture of the activities of U.S.
multinationals. However, the advantage of this measure - which is to include intangible and
financial assets - is also its limitation. If these assets are rearranged between related affiliates
to diminish their global tax liabilities, they may not reflect the real activity of the affiliates.
The relationship between assets and PPE during the period considered by this paper indicates
that both measures tell the same story, however. The correlation between U.S. assets (from the
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
ln capital (assets) 16.210 1.935 11.861 20.919
ln E&P before tax 13.827 1.756 8.675 17.502
ln dividends 11.718 2.627 0 15.772
ln Subpart F 11.319 2.166 4.111 15.341
ln GDP 25.726 1.431 21.953 29.198
ln GDP per capita 9.218 0.908 6.650 10.467
ln trade 4.131 0.580 2.690 5.628
ln distance 8.844 0.586 6.307 9.692
ln inflation 1.780 1.056 -1.110 7.638
ln exchange rate 3.046 2.848 -0.552 13.564
ln physical infrastructure 2.964 0.522 1.198 4.191
Law and Order 4.639 1.417 1 6
Average tax rate 0.222 0.105 0.047 0.594
IRS U.S. treasury CFC database) and U.S. PPE (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis) for
the years 1992-2000 is fairly high (0.94) and it only drops to 0.90 in first differences, indicating
that assets provide a reasonably good approximation for the level of, and changes in the real
activity of U.S. multinationals.
The average tax rate, which is an average corporate tax rate per host country, is also derived
from the U.S. Treasury CFC files. The average tax rate for each country is calculated by dividing
the total income tax paid by CFC located in that country by their total earnings and profits, for
foreign corporations with current earnings and profits positive before income taxes.11 This tax
rate represents a good approximation of the tax liabilities effectively paid by U.S. investors. As
argued by De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), the average corporate tax rate can “take account of
tax planning activities, complex tax provisions and discretionary administrative practices of tax
authorities” (p667). As summarized by Grubert and Mutti (2000), they “reflect all provisions
of the tax system as well as special arrangements.” (p829).
To estimate the influence of foreign taxes on the behaviors of U.S. multinationals, it is
essential to control for the impact of other determinants of U.S. activity abroad. The papers
that work on the allocation of U.S. capital, such as Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice
(1994), Grubert and Mutti (2000), Altshuler et al. (2001) or Mutti and Grubert (2004) generally
use the size of the domestic market (GDP), the GDP per capita, the geographical proximity of
11The calculation of the average tax only includes CFC with positive income in order not to bias upward the
tax measure.
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the host country (distance), the level of inflation12 and a measure of trade openness, to control
for host country characteristics. The same variables are used in this paper. Host country
GDP, GDP per capita and trade openness are taken from the World Bank Global Development
Network Growth Database. Trade openness is measured by the sum of exports and imports of
goods and services divided by GDP, and is lagged by two years to reduce any endogeneity bias.
The bilateral distance data are taken from the CEPII. Finally, inflation at the consumer price
index is from the International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics).
This analysis differs from the previous literature in that three additional control variables
are included: real exchange rate, physical infrastructure, and a Law and Order index.
A real exchange rate variable is included for two reasons. On the one hand, a host country’s
depreciating currency can make firms more likely to invest in the country because the local
acquisition costs will be lower. On the other hand, in developing countries, a weak currency
can be seen as a signal of instability and generates uncertainty. Real exchange rate data come
from the real annual country exchange rates compiled by Mathew Shane from the “Economic
Research Service” of the United States Department of Agriculture.
Physical infrastructures are included to avoid an omitted variable bias, since they can be
correlated with the measure of taxes if they are financed by taxes on capital. They are proxied by
the number of telephone lines divided by GDP, taken from the World Bank Global Development
Network Growth Database.13
Finally, the Law and Order index computed by the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) is added to consider host country legislative maturity. This index is assessed sep-
arately for law and for order, with each sub-component being allocated from zero to three
points. As explained by the ICRG: “the law sub-component is an assessment of the strength
and impartiality of the legal system, while the order sub-component is an assessment of popular
observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating - 3 - in terms of its judicial
system, but a low rating - 1 - if it suffers from a very high crime rate or if the law is routinely
ignored without effective sanction”. This measure is particularly appropriate since the focus
here is not only on the existence of law but on the quality of law enforcement. I expect the
notion of well-enforced transfer pricing legislation to correspond to high values of this index,
while weak or non-existent transfer pricing legislation should correspond to low values. The
index of Law and Order (average value for the period 1992-2000) is listed for the countries of
12Inflation may have a negative impact on the volume of capital invested because it indicates increased
macroeconomic instability. Furthermore, according to Altshuler et al. (2001), inflation may be correlated with
the average tax rate since depreciation allowances are based on the historical costs of assets.
13According to Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Gunning (1999), while telecommunications is
the only infrastructure variable widely available for developing countries, it is likely that different kinds of
infrastructure are highly correlated. However, the variation in stock of telecommunications is largely explained
by GDP per capita (Forestier et al., 2002), so Fink and Kenny (2003) propose measuring infrastructure by the
per-income stock of telephone lines in order to avoid correlations with market related variables.
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the sample in Appendix. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 U.S. Capital and Foreign Tax Rates
Table 2 reports fixed-effects regressions of U.S. capital invested abroad on the level of foreign
average corporate tax rates. The model estimated is
ln(CAPit) = αi + β1 (ATRit) + β2 ln(Hit) + λt + εit (1)
where the U.S. capital invested abroad “CAPit” depends on country-specific fixed effects αi,
on a set of standard determinants Hit, on the average tax rate ATRit and on time dummies λt;
εit is the error term. The subscript i denotes recipient countries while the subscript t denotes
time. All variables, except the average tax rate variable, are in natural logarithms.14
A fixed-effect model is estimated because a Hausman test indicates that the individual-
specific error component is correlated with the included explanatory variables. The resulting
bias of this correlation, generally called heterogeneity bias, is a bias caused from omitting time-
invariant variables. Without accounting for this country heterogeneity, such as government
regulations on labor market, environment, or on FDI, the OLS estimators would be biased and
inconsistent.15 The fixed-effects procedure eliminates unobserved heterogeneity bias by remov-
ing this country-specific unobserved effect that is correlated with the explanatory variables.16
With the bias thus eliminated, the effects of taxes on U.S. capital are identified from within
variations; time-invariant factors being removed by the use of fixed-effects.
General tests for functional form misspecification, such as a link test and a RESET test,
suggest that the model is well specified.17 Influential observations, both in terms of leverage and
outlierness, have been removed according to a Cook’s D test. Checking for multicollinearity,
the greatest variance inflation factor value among all the regressions is 6.39, indicating that
14This has two advantages: such transformation reduces the influence of large values and allows the coefficients
to be interpreted as ordinary elasticities.
15For example, government ceilings on foreign ownership can influence the relationship between taxes and
investment or between taxes and earnings and profits, dividend payments or subpart F income. For instance,
the literature suggests that transfer pricing manipulation can be greater when the capital is totally controlled
by the parent firm, as the decision to shift profit is taken unilaterally and thus not limited by the divergent
interests of a partner (Kant, 1990; Desai et al., 2004). Consequently, investment and net incomes of wholly-
owned affiliates are found to be significantly more sensitive to foreign tax rates than are investment and net
incomes of partially-owned affiliates (Desai et al., 2004; Aze´mar and Corcos, 2008).
16U.S. capital into a host country can also depend on the FDI in neighboring countries (see for example
Ekholm et al. (2003), Yeaple (2003), Baltagi et al. (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007)). As shown by Blonigen et
al. (2007), country-specific dummies capture such spatial interdependence.
17The link test creates two new variables, a variable of prediction and one of squared prediction. The second
variable should not have any explanatory power if the model is properly specified when the model is refitted using
the prediction and the squared prediction variables as predictors. The Ramsey (1969)’s regression specification
error test (RESET) adds polynomials in the OLS fitted values to detect functional form misspecification.
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there is no near perfect linear relationship among the predictors. Finally, standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Column (1) shows that among the control variables, GDP, trade openness and physical
infrastructure are factors that positively and significantly drive U.S. investment. In contrast, the
GDP per capita, the real exchange rate and the level of inflation are statistically insignificant.
Of particular interest, the sign and magnitude of the average tax rate (−1.4) clearly indicate
that an increase in corporate taxes significantly reduces investment. With this different sample
of countries and a larger period, the magnitude of the average tax rate coefficient appears to
be fairly close to the maximum semi-elasticities obtained by Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines
and Rice (1994), Grubert and Mutti (2000) and Altshuler et al. (2001) (−0.6, −1.2, −1.7 and
−1.4 respectively); but is higher than their mean semi-elasticities values (−1.7, −10.7, −4 and
−2.7 respectively).18 The lower effect of corporate taxes on investment obtained in this paper
(knowing that fixed effects are included) suggests that taxes in these previous studies might
capture other effects.19
U.S. investors could be less reactive to tax rates below the U.S. statutory tax rate (tus),
since restrictions on deferral and cross-crediting limit the fiscal advantages provided by low-tax
jurisdictions. In Column (2), the likely responsiveness of U.S. capital to corporate tax rates
in high and low-tax jurisdictions is shown by interacting the average tax rate with a ‘high-tax
countries dummy’ that takes the value of 1 when ATR > tus. The interaction term has the
expected sign but is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no significant difference
in the sensitivity of capital to corporate taxes which are higher or lower than the U.S. statutory
tax rate. Thus, the impact of taxes in low-tax jurisdictions indicates that the benefit provided
by fiscal incentives is substantial, in spite of anti-deferral and cross-crediting limitations.
Does this result mean that there is a constant proportional negative effect of taxes on
investment, as assumed in column (1)? Another possibility to consider non-linearity in the
model is to test the Grubert and Mutti (2000) assessment of a magnified impact of very low tax
rates on capital allocation decisions. As shown by column (3), the inverse of the average tax
rate is statistically significant and support the hypothesis that this magnified effect occurs.20 To
illustrate this result, several level of average tax rates and their corresponding level of confidence
are computed by simulations.21 On average, a 1% increase of the tax rate significantly (95%
18See the summary statistics of the meta analysis of De Mooij and Ederveen (2003).
19The magnitude of the average tax rate coefficient obtained with a cross-section in Column 4 tends to support
this hypothesis.
20Following Grubert and Mutti (2000) the inverse of 0.1 plus the average tax rate is used as the tax variable.
The value 0.1 is added to avoid the extreme values that would otherwise be created at very low tax rates.
21To implement this approach, the CLARIFY software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results
computed by King et al. (2000) is used. In an unreported table, the parameters of the regression corresponding
to column (3) are reestimated, and 1000 sets of simulated coefficients from their posterior distribution are
obtained to finally compute the desired quantity of interest and its associated level of confidence.
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Table 2: U.S. Capital and Foreign Tax Rates
Dependent variable: ln capital (Assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4)* (5)*
ln GDP 1.140a 1.132a 1.171a 1.199a 1.158a
(0.298) (0.292) (0.298) (0.18) (0.162)
ln GDP per capita 0.28 0.209 0.364 −0.326 −0.114
(0.466) (0.457) (0.487) (0.368) (0.334)
ln trade 0.686c 0.688c 0.717c 1.282a 1.320a
(0.405) (0.4) (0.41) (0.401) (0.344)
ln inflation 0.015 0.02 0.008 −0.09 0.003
(0.04) (0.044) (0.04) (0.205) (0.187)
ln exchange rate −0.026 −0.019 −0.03 −0.079 −0.079
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.053) (0.055)
ln physical infrastructure 0.467c 0.461c 0.480c −0.188 −0.13
(0.238) (0.233) (0.243) (0.453) (0.424)
Average tax rate (ATR) −1.396a −0.811 −3.770c
(0.401) (0.654) (1.897)
ATR*high tax countries’ dummy −1.018
(1.428)






ln distance −0.421c −0.520b
(0.209) (0.228)
Constant −13.306 −12.682 −15.471c −13.788c −13.399c
(8.751) (8.645) (8.532) (7.155) (6.507)
Observations 216 216 216 21 21
R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.94 0.94
Notes: The letters “a”, “b” and “c” indicate respectively a significance level
of 1, 5 and 10 percent. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *
cross-section for the year 1992.
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level of confidence) decreases U.S. capital by 5% when ATR is between 0 and 10%, by 1.7%
when ATR is between 10 and 20%, by 0.8% when ATR is between 20 and 30%, and by 0.5%
when ATR is between 30 and 40%. The higher sensitivity of capital to low tax rates may be
due to the incentive to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions. To go further with this idea, the
relationships between taxes and tax planning practices are examined in the following section.
One problem encountered by using backward-looking average tax rates is that this tax
measure may be endogenous to the amount of U.S. capital invested abroad, as the rate can
be lowered by large amounts of new investment. In theory, endogeneity can be overcome by
instrumenting the troublesome variable with instruments satisfying both the exogeneity and
relevance criteria. Altshuler et al. (2001) correct for this potential endogeneity bias by using
host country’s statutory tax rate which is obviously exogenous as its level does not reflect
special fiscal incentives granted by the host country. However, the relevance of this instrument
may be limited by its lack of variation across time as compared to the average tax rate.22
Another alternative is to use the adjusted average tax rate computed by Grubert and Mutti
(2000). Given their access to firm-level data, Grubert and Mutti (2000)’s approach to control
for endogeneity is to calculate an adjusted average tax rate which is not distorted by recent
investment, by using the age distribution of U.S. CFC. In Columns (4) and (5) the sample is
restricted to a cross-section for the year 1992 in order to test the Grubert and Mutti’s adjusted
variable and to compare its coefficient to the non-adjusted one for the same period.2324 The
adjusted average tax rate appears to have a very similar coefficient (−3.895) to the non-adjusted
one (−3.770), indicating that the departure model does not suffer from biased estimators. A
similar conclusion is reached in Grubert and Mutti (2000).
4.2 U.S. Tax Avoidance and Foreign Tax Rates
Equation (1) describes the relationship between taxes and investment. In a second step, I
measure U.S. multinationals’ tax planning practices by investigating the responsiveness of U.S.
earnings and profit before taxation, dividends repatriated and Subpart F income, to the level
of foreign tax rates. The models to be estimated are
22Altshuler et al. (2001) report a non negligible increase in the standard errors of the instrumented tax
coefficient. In a non-reported table, when instrumenting the average tax rate by the statutory tax rate, a similar
increase in the standard errors is also reported. This is because the correlation between the average tax rate and
the statutory tax rate (0.32) is not very high. The Cragg-Donald F-statistics (15.66) is nevertheless fairly close
to the 16.38 Stock-Yoko critical value for a 10% wald test, suggesting that the instrument is borderline valid
(Stock and Yogo, 2005; Cragg and Donald, 1993). A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that the exogeneity of
the average tax rate cannot be rejected. Therefore, the OLS estimator is consistant and more efficient than the
IV estimator (the variance of the OLS estimator being smaller than the IV one).
23Grubert and Mutti (2000) only created this adjusted measure for the year 1992 because it performs similarly
to the unadjusted one.
24As previously mentioned, the geographical proximity of the host country can affect U.S. capital. The time-
invariant variable ‘distance’ that could not be estimated with the fixed-effect model is added when the sample
is restricted to a cross-section.
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ln(Profitit) = αi + β1 ln(Assetit) + β2 (ATRit) + β3 ln(Hit) + λt + εit (2)
ln(Dividendit) = αi + β1 ln(Assetit) + β2 (ATRit) + β3 ln(Hit) + λt + εit (3)
ln(SubpartFit) = αi + β1 ln(Assetit) + β2 (ATRit) + β3 ln(Hit) + λt + εit (4)
Profit, dividend or Subpart F income are likely to be proportional to the size of operations.
To remove undesired dimensional characteristics, the variable total assets is added as an ex-
planatory variable.25 This allows to interpret variations in the dependent variables as due to
tax planning practices. Table 3 reports within-effects estimates of the coefficient of interest, β2.
As previously mentioned, Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), and Louie
and Rousslang (2008) provide evidence of income shifting from high-tax jurisdiction to low-tax
jurisdiction of U.S. affiliates, with a significant negative impact of taxes on profitability mea-
sures. Grubert and Mutti (1991) regress after-tax profit/equity ratios and after-tax profit/sale
ratios26 on corporate tax rates in 29 countries for the year 1982 (controlling for GDP growth),
while Hines and Rice (1994) analyze the relationship between pre-tax income27 and tax rates
in 59 countries for the year 1982 (controlling for capital inputs and GDP per capita). Louie
and Rousslang (2008) measure the effect of taxes on U.S. firms’ after-tax profit/asset ratio in
47 countries for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996 (controlling for GDP growth, host-country gov-
ernance, bilateral tax treaty and NAFTA agreement). Column (1), which presents estimated
coefficients from equation (2), also displays a significant negative relationship between earnings
and profit before taxation and average tax rate. Thus controlling for the size of operations and
for unobserved country fixed-effects it appears that firms statistically significantly report higher
profit in low-tax countries than the profit normally associated with their use of inputs. The
estimates imply that a 1% point higher tax rate reduces reported earnings and profit by 1%.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis of income shifting, and as suggested by Grubert
and Slemrod (1998) it contradicts the “usual presumption that, in order to equalize after-tax
returns, high tax rates will require high pre-tax rates of return”(p.366).
Column (2) reports the results of the estimation of the relationship between the repatria-
tion of dividends and the host country average tax rate, corresponding to equation (3). This
estimation gives evidence of a significant positive effect of host country tax rates on the distri-
bution of dividends. Controlling for levels of productive inputs, a 1% point increase in the tax
25Note that by not imposing any constraint on β1, this procedure is more flexible than scaling the dependent
variable by total assets, since ln(Profitit/Assetit) implies that β1 = 1.
26The use of sales and equity in their profitability measures is limited for several reasons and suggests to
interpret the results with caution. Indeed, the measure of sales can be affected by transfer pricing manipulations
and lower profit-to-equity ratios in high-tax countries may reflect financing strategies (it can be advantageous
to be financed by debt in high-tax countries since interests are deductible).
27Total pre-tax net income and pre-tax non financial income (plus interest payments minus interest receipts).
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Table 3: U.S. Tax Planning
ln E&P before tax ln dividends ln Subpart F
(1) (2) (3)
ln asset 0.719a 0.417c 0.916a
(0.06) (0.225) (0.202)
ln GDP 1.034a 0.401 0.034
(0.203) (0.63) (0.493)
ln GDP per capita −1.386a 1.218c −0.965b
(0.301) (0.688) (0.434)
ln trade 0.868a 2.273b −0.058
(0.264) (0.851) (0.52)
ln inflation 0.045c 0.153 0.159a
(0.023) (0.135) (0.049)
ln exchange rate −0.079 −0.692 0.082
(0.078) (0.432) (0.076)
ln physical infrastructure −1.016a −0.08 −1.353a
(0.101) (0.299) (0.452)
Average tax rate (ATR) −1.023a 2.466c −1.357c
(0.336) (1.323) (0.784)
Constant −26.215a −24.938 −10.401
(5.108) (16.177) (14.358)
Observations 191 151 190
R-squared 0.81 0.24 0.51
Notes: The letters “a”, “b” and “c” indicate respectively a significance level
of 1, 5 and 10 percent. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Times
dummies are included. E&P is for earnings and profits.
rate is associated with 2.5% greater dividend payments. Because a decrease in the foreign tax
rate increases tax differentials between the U.S. and the host country, subsidiaries located in
low-tax countries are less likely to remit dividends to their U.S. parents. In line with Kopits
(1972) and Grubert and Mutti (2001), these results suggest that U.S. affiliates are more likely
to delay dividend repatriations when they are located in low tax countries. From this result, it
is interesting to note that firms seem to take more advantage of deferring taxes until the repa-
triation of the profits than cross-crediting. As emphasized by Hines and Rice (1994), these two
attractive ways of diminishing global tax liabilities are mutually exclusive, in that the former
is triggered by deferral and the latter by repatriation.
Finally, column (3) investigates the relationship between the level of Subpart F income
and the foreign tax rate, corresponding to equation (4). As previously explained, Subpart F
income is required, under the Subpart F provision, to be treated as if it were distributed to
its American owners (it is taxed without any delay). With this regime, Subpart F income
should not be shifted to, and abnormally accumulated in low-tax destinations if investors can
no longer take advantage of deferral. However, the possibility to cross-credit tax liabilities on
passive income provides an incentive to shift this income in low-tax countries and since it can be
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more advantageous to place earnings in passive investment than to repatriate them (Hines and
Rice, 1994), an accumulation of Subpart F income in low-tax countries can be observed. The
statistically significant negative sign of the tax coefficient in column (3) is in favor of the tax
planning assumption since it indicates that U.S. subsidiaries significantly report more passive
income in low-tax countries than what can be suggested by their activity.
4.3 Host Country’s Stage of Development and Legislative Maturity
as Determinants of Tax Avoidance
Investigating separately the influence of taxes on four decisions of multinational firms, it can
be seen that investment, reported active and passive income and dividend retention are higher
in low-tax countries. Because income shifting implies a manipulation of transfer prices, multi-
national firms may not only choose to exploit cross-country differences in corporate tax rates
to minimize their fiscal burden, but also differences in transfer pricing regulations. Allowing
potential differences in the role of corporate taxation at different levels of host country develop-
ment, U.S. multinationals’ tax planning activities are first investigated by adding an interaction
term between the GDP per capita and the average tax rate in equations (2)-(4). This allows
to assess whether there are magnified tax planning opportunities in less-developed countries
where transfer pricing enforcement is difficult to implement. The results, reported in Table 4
(Columns (1), (3), and (5)), show that the interaction terms have the expected signs but are
statistically insignificant.
The limited role of the country’s stage of development in tax planning practices may be due
to the fact that the level of host country GDP per capita is a very approximate proxy for the
performance of the legal system. Supporting this assumption, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) do
not find evidence of a positive impact of incomes on the quality of governance. More precisely,
they stress that a number of countries, generally Latin American countries, perform poorly in
terms of rule of law relative to their per capita income because their elite benefits from the
“statu-quo of low quality institutions”.
The ‘Law and Order’ index developed by the ICRG that explicitly refers to the quality of law
enforcement, may better reflect the strength of transfer pricing regulations than the level of GDP
per capita. Indeed, with this index, a country that does not provide effective sanction when
the law is ignored corresponds to a low score of Law and Order and is expected to be less able
or more reluctant to regulate transfer pricing manipulations than a country with a better legal
enforcement. Average values of the Law and Order index indicate that law is better enforced
in developed countries (5.70) than in developing countries (3.51). However, as illustrated by a
simple scatter-plot (see Figure 1 in Appendix), some countries perform poorly in terms of Law
and Order relative to their level of GDP per capita. In line with Kaufmann and Kraay (2002)
the figure illustrates that the majority of Latin American countries are below the regression line.
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Table 4: Host Country Level of Development, Legislation Maturity, and U.S. Tax Planning
ln E&P before tax ln dividends ln Subpart F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln asset 0.724a 0.734a 0.420c 0.478c 0.926a 0.957a
(0.063) (0.056) (0.224) (0.245) (0.198) (0.191)
ln GDP 1.025a 0.972a 0.392 0.319 −0.002 −0.024
(0.205) (0.19) (0.652) (0.626) (0.482) (0.465)
ln GDP per capita −1.395a −1.174a 1.195 1.376c −1.020b −0.747c
(0.312) (0.298) (0.748) (0.699) (0.46) (0.406)
ln trade 0.867a 0.842a 2.270b 2.103b −0.055 −0.05
(0.265) (0.26) (0.869) (0.874) (0.518) (0.546)
ln inflation 0.045c 0.045c 0.154 0.148 0.152a 0.146a
(0.023) (0.025) (0.135) (0.134) (0.05) (0.051)
ln exchange rate −0.078 −0.091 −0.695 −0.628 0.085 0.068
(0.079) (0.072) (0.426) (0.432) (0.074) (0.078)
ln physical infrastructure −1.024a −0.995a −0.1 0.112 −1.409a −1.400a
(0.108) (0.111) (0.362) (0.338) (0.458) (0.445)
Average tax rate (ATR) −1.6 −3.159a 1.287 3.572 −4.997 −5.180b
(2.593) (0.948) (12.428) (3.337) (5.003) (2.135)
ATR*GDP per capita 0.066 0.13 0.401
(0.304) (1.364) (0.541)
ATR* law and order 0.531b −0.265 0.891c
(0.223) (0.706) (0.463)
Law and order −0.161a −0.046 −0.237
(0.052) (0.258) (0.15)
Constant −26.055a −25.747a −24.746 −22.427 −9.765 −11.018
(5.176) (4.794) (16.826) (15.936) (14.333) (13.911)
Observations 191 191 151 151 190 190
R-squared 0.81 0.82 0.24 0.25 0.51 0.53
Notes: The letters “a”, “b” and “c” indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. E&P is for earnings and profits.
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Therefore, despite a high coefficient of correlation between GDP per capita and Law and Order
(0.76), these variables also have information not in common. An interaction term between Law
and Order and average tax rate is included in columns (2), (4) and (6). It appears that the effect
of foreign tax rates on earnings and profits before taxation and on Subpart F income significantly
decreases with the strength of the rule of law. In other words, U.S. multinationals report more
income from active and passive investment in low-tax low-legal system countries than would
normally be associated with their total assets, suggesting that the degree of enforcement of the
legal system is a significant determinant of multinational income shifting. Indeed, at the mean
value of the Law and Order index (4.63), a 1% point decrease of taxes increases earnings and
profits by 0.7% and Subpart F income by 1%. The same decrease of taxes when the Law and
Order index equals 2 (corresponding to Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico, South Africa and Indonesia
in 2000), increases earnings and profits by 2.1% and Subpart F income by 3.4%. Interestingly,
contrary to illicit tax planning practices, the retention of dividends in low-tax countries is not
significantly affected by the legal environment.
The statistically significant accumulation of Subpart F income in countries in which ac-
tive income is shifted also suggest that passive investment appear to be more profitable than
repatriation (in spite of the Subpart F rule), when active investment opportunities are lacking.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown, through four interrelated approaches, that foreign corporate tax rates
have an important impact on U.S. multinationals’ behavior. The evidence indicates that taxes
not only influence the allocation of investment abroad but once a profit is generated they play
a role in the decisions about first, where to report this taxable profit and second, whether to
reinvest the earnings abroad or to repatriate them. The accumulation of Subpart F income
in countries in which abnormal profits and dividend retention are reported also suggests that
passive investments represent a third alternative to the reinvestment in active business versus
repatriation tradeoff. In spite of the Subpart F provision, this evidence tends to corroborate
Hines and Rice (1994)’s assumption that deferral, and by extension income shifting, can be
attractive even if active investment opportunities are lacking.
Overall, despite the complications generated by anti-deferral regimes and cross-crediting
limitations, low-tax countries remain attractive locations for investors, driving real activities
and taxable profit. The attractive power of low-tax jurisdictions appears however to be weak-
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Table 5: Appendix of Average Law and Order index (1992-2000)
Host country Law and Order Host country Law and Order
Colombia 1.4 Greece 4.6
Guatemala 2 Korea 4.6
Honduras 2 Thailand 4.8
Brazil 2.5 Czech Republic 5
Kenya 2.5 Hong Kong 5
South Africa 2.6 Israel 5
Mexico 2.8 Portugal 5.2
Panama 2.8 Spain 5.2
Dominican Republic 3 Belgium 5.4
Ecuador 3 Morocco 5.4
Egypt 3 Italy 5.6
El Salvador 3 Germany 5.8
Nigeria 3 Ireland 5.8
Peru 3 Japan 5.8
Uruguay 3 Australia 6
Philippines 3.4 Austria 6
Indonesia 3.5 Canada 6
India 3.8 Denmark 6
Costa Rica 4 Finland 6
Poland 4 France 6
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Luxembourg 6
Venezuela 4 Netherlands 6
Zimbabwe 4 New Zealand 6
Malaysia 4.2 Norway 6
Turkey 4.2 Sweden 6
Argentina 4.25 Switzerland 6
Chile 4.6 United Kingdom 6
Source: ICRG.
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